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HUMAN DIGNITY - OUR SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE
1 
 
Nazeem MI Goolam
2
 
    University of South Africa  
Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected.
3
 
1 Introduction  
There can be little doubt that, as far as constitutional interpretation and statutory 
interpretation in general is concerned, South Africa is undergoing a transformation from a 
formal, positivistic vision of law to a substantive, natural law vision of law.
4
 And the single 
most significant factor in this transformation is the existence of constitutional values. For 
the first time in South Africa, courts (in particular the Constitutional Court) must decide 
cases on the basis of these values. It is therefore simply erroneous and naive to say that 
'the Constitutional Court has been so fixated with the role of 'values' in the first year of its 
existence'
5
 and that the court is 'obsessed' with the role of 'values'
6
. Of these values, the 
three most fundamental in any open and democratic society are human dignity, equality 
and freedom.  Amongst this trinity of values human dignity, it is submitted, finds pride of 
place. In sections 1, 7, 36
7
 and 39
8
 of South Africa's final constitution it takes primary 
mention. Section 1 provides:  
The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign democratic state 
founded on the following values:  
(a)  Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement 
of human rights and freedoms...  
1 Revised version of a paper delivered at the International Conference on Development in the 
Contemporary Constitutional State, Potchefstroom University, 2 - 3 November 2000. 2 BA LLB (University 
of Cape Town) MCL (International Islamic University, Malaysia. 3 S 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 4 Certainly not the cynical vision of "Rainbow Jurisprudence" put forward by 
Cockrell. See Cockrell 1996 SAJHR  
1. 5 Supra at 7. 6 Supra at 10. 7 The limitation clause. 8 The interpretation clause.  
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Elsewhere I have stated:  
It is not insignificant that the value of human dignity does not appear either 
after the values of equality and freedom or between the value of equality 
and freedom. On the contrary, it is highly significant that human dignity 
appears before both equality and freedom because essentially, human 
rights law must serve the purpose of effectively protecting the human 
dignity of the members of any  
society.
9 
 
Some of the pertinent questions briefly addressed in this article are:  
1) What does human dignity entail?  
2) Is human dignity a right or a duty?  
3) How should it be understood in a plural society such as ours?  
4) What about the impact of modern technology on human dignity?  
5) Is our understanding of the concept/value/idea of human dignity not too  
European/Western in nature? For example, the issue of gays and lesbians is a 
human rights and human dignity question in the West, while other cultures find 
homosexuality abhorrent and uncivilised.   
6) Should we explore a religious and spiritual philosophy of human dignity?  
 
These are some of the pertinent issues which, I believe, need to be carefully discussed in 
attempting to understand the concept/value/idea of human dignity in our multicultural 
country.   
2 What does human dignity entail?  
First, then, what does human dignity entail? Article 1
10
 of the 1949 German Constitution 
or Basic Law (Grundgesetz) provides:  
 
9  Goolam 1997 SA PublicLaw 186.  
10  Protection of human dignity.  
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(1) The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of 
all state authority.  
(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human  
rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.  
 
In the original German the first sentence of article 1 (1) reads: "Die Würde des Menschen 
ist unantastbar." The word "Würde" may be translated as "worth" or "value."  In the now 
well-known South African Constitutional Court decision of S v Makwanyane
11
 Judge 
O'Regan expressed a similar view. According to her:  
Recognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth 
of human beings:  human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of 
respect and concern. This right therefore is the foundation of many of the 
other rights that are specifically entrenched in ... [the Bill of Rights].
12 
 
Referring to Kantian philosophical thought, Jones writes that dignity is "above all price 
and so admits of no equivalent".
13
 Commenting on the significance of the concept of 
human dignity in German constitutional jurisprudence. Donald Kommers states:  
Germany's emphasis on dignity is nevertheless important, and for three 
reasons: First, the principle of human dignity makes normative demands 
on the state; second, it informs the scope and meaning of all the rights and 
guarantees of the Basic Law; and third, it is the source of the so-called 
objective value that the Federal Constitutional Court has inferred from the 
Basic Law's principles and structures. In short, the Constitutional Court 
envisions the Basic Law as a unified structure of objective principles and 
rights crowned by the master value of human  
  dignity.
14  
 
11  S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC); S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).  
12  Supra at par 328.  
13  Jones Kant's Principle of Personality 127; see also De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 
Handbook 217.  
14  July 1998, on receiving an honorary doctor of law degree from Ruprecht - Karl's University, 
Heidelberg, Germany.  
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Elsewhere, commenting on the human dignity clause as the centre of Germany's scheme 
of constitutional values, the learned author writes:  
 
In the view of the Federal Constitutional Court, this clause expresses the highest value of 
the Basic Law, informing the substance and spirit of the entire document. While 
encompassing all guaranteed rights, the concept of human dignity also includes a 
morality of duty that may limit the exercise of a fundamental right.
15  
 
Delivering the Third Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture
16
 in May 2000, the President of the 
Constitutional Court, Judge Arthur Chaskalson stated:  
The affirmation of human dignity as one of the founding values of the 
Constitution is significant. The interim Constitution emphasised the values 
of democracy, freedom and equality. Although dignity is immanent in these 
values and in the rights entrenched in the interim Constitution's Bill of 
Rights, its role as a foundational value of the constitutional order was not 
acknowledged in specific terms until the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. 
Consistently with this, the 1996 Constitution now refers to the 'inherent 
dignity' of all people, thus asserting that respect for human dignity, and all 
that flows from it, as an attribute of life itself, and not a privilege granted by 
the state.  
3  Human dignity – right of duty?  
This leads to the second question, namely is human dignity merely a right - as section 10 
declares -or is it not also a duty/an obligation/a responsibility? Indeed, a value - which 
human dignity is - implies that people are duty-bound to uphold it. Every human being 
has a responsibility to treat every other human being in a dignified and humane manner. 
Human dignity is therefore a universal human duty, a universal human responsibility. In 
this regard, the Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities is highly instructive. Its 
preamble commences as follows:  
15  Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence 298.  
16  ,Chaskalson 2000 SAJHR 193.  
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Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world and implies obligations or responsibilities.
17  
 
Articles 1 and 2 - which fall under the heading Fundamental Principles for 
Humanity - of the Declaration read:  
Article 1 Every person regardless of gender, ethnic origin, social status, political 
opinion, language, age nationality or religion has a responsibility to treat all 
people in a humane way.  
 
Article 2 No person should lend support to any form of inhumane behaviour, but 
all people have a responsibility to strive for the dignity and the self-esteem of all 
others.
18  
 
Indeed, non-Western philosophies - African, Asian and indigenous traditions - lay 
great emphasis on the obligations/responsibilities of an individual as compared 
with his/her rights. In this regard, it is apt to quote the words of one of the most 
dignified human beings of the past 100 years: Mohandas Gandhi. The Mahatma 
did not advocate individual rights in the Western sense.  Rather, he advocated 
"dharma, an ethic of community, responsibility and loyalty."
19
 He said:  
All rights to be deserved and preserved come from duty well done. Thus 
the very right to live accrues to us only when we do the duty of citizenship 
of the world.
20  
 
Dharma has been described or defined as:  
 
...that which is established or firm, steadfast decree, statute, ordinance, 
law; usage, practice, customary observance or prescribed conduct, duty, 
right.  Justice (often as a synonym of punishment); virtue, morality, 
religion, religious merit, good  
17 Schmidt Grundpflichten 306.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Ayoub "Asian Spiritual and Moral Values and Human Rights".  
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 works, ...according to the nature of anything, ... holding to the law, doing one's 
duty, ... nature, character, peculiar condition or essential quality, property, mark, 
peculiarity, ... sacrifice, ... associating with the virtuous, ... devotion, ... a bow ...
21 
 
It is this "ethic of community", this communal approach, this communitarianism which 
distinguishes the approach to human rights discourse - and thus the concept of human 
dignity - in African and non-Western societies from the liberal, individual-centred Western 
tradition. It is submitted that the Western emphasis on individual rights and freedoms is 
often to the detriment of the collectivity.
22 
 
As Judge Mokgoro so adequately explained in the Makwanyane
23
 decision, the spirit of 
ubuntu emphasises respect for human dignity.  Metaphorically speaking, it expresses 
itself in umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, describing the significance of group solidarity on 
survival issues so central to the survival of communities. The point is that we in South 
Africa, in Africa, should not - and cannot - rely solely on Western/European jurisprudence 
in attempting to understand the concept/value/idea of human dignity. After all, the past 
500 years have seen arguably the worst and most horrendous violations of human rights 
and human dignity by western peoples on the non-western peoples of the world.  
Human dignity in a plural society – the notion of tolerance  
How, then, should human dignity be understood in a plural society such as ours? Paul 
Sieghart states that the hallmarks of a democratic society are "pluralism, 
broadmindedness and tolerance."
24 
If dignity is to be truly respected and protected - as 
provided for in section 10 of the South African Constitution - the notion of tolerance, 
labelled by UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) 
as the endangered virtue demands broader understanding.  A brief examination of 
UNESCO's 1995 Declaration on the Principles of Tolerance
25
 is appropriate. The 
document preceding the declaration, entitled A Global Quest for Tolerance, declares that  
20  Traer Faith and Human Rights Support 131; see also Muzaffar Human Rights and the New World Order.  
21  See Monier-Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary 510; see also Domanski 2000 CILSA 248.  
22  For a poetic communitarian critique of liberalism see Cranova 1999 Codicillus 41.  
23  See n 8 supra at par 308.  
24 Sieghart International Law of Human Rights 784-791.  
NMI Goolam  PER/PELJ 2001(4)1 
49/74 
 
tolerance has always been considered a moral virtue and that it is also the foundation of 
democracy and human rights. Tolerance is appreciation of diversity, the ability to live and 
let others live, the ability to adhere to one's convictions while accepting that others 
adhere to theirs and the ability to enjoy one's rights and freedoms without infringing on 
those of others. Intolerance in multi-ethnic, multi- religious or multicultural societies leads 
to violations of human rights, violence or armed conflict.  
Article 1 of the Declaration is headed 'Meaning of Tolerance' and it is necessary, in the 
context of this paper, to reproduce its first two paragraphs, which state:  
1.1 Tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity 
of our world's cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being 
human. It is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication and 
freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Tolerance is harmony in 
difference. It is not only a moral duty, it is also a political and legal 
requirement.  Tolerance, the virtue that makes peace possible, 
contributes to the replacement of the culture of war by a culture of 
peace.  
1.2 Tolerance is not a concession, condescension or indulgence. 
Tolerance is, above all, an active attitude prompted by recognition of 
the universal human rights and fundamental freedoms of others. In no 
circumstance can it be used to justify infringements of these 
fundamental values. Tolerance is to be exercised by individuals, 
groups and states.  
Article 4, which is devoted to education, states that education for tolerance should aim at 
countering influences that lead to fear and exclusion of others, and should help young 
people to develop capacities for independent judgment, critical thinking and ethical 
reasoning.  
 
25  Adopted by UNESCO Member States in Paris on 16th November 1995.  
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5  Human dignity in the age of technology  
The value of human dignity will, of course, impact not only on the other two values - 
equality and freedom - in the trinity of fundamental democratic values but also on the 
manner in which the rights in the Bill of Rights is interpreted. One thinks of the right to life 
(including the beginning and end of life), issues relating to criminal justice, freedom of 
religion, and from a global perspective, the right to asylum. But, perhaps, the most 
pertinent question in this regard is: what about the protection of human dignity in the age 
of technology?  How can human dignity be protected in the computer age or when 
considering the dramatic potential of modern gene technology, in vitro fertilization or other 
technical and scientific developments? Weeramantry, Vice-President of the International 
Court of Justice, has further asked: "What are the technologies that erode this high 
recognition of human dignity through their impact upon the human body?"
26 
 
Judge Weeramantry is of the view that research on the human body for therapeutic and 
preventive purposes must always go ahead. He warns, however, that as more knowledge 
is acquired, new possibilities open up the use of that knowledge for unethical purposes or 
for purposes the ethical value of which is debatable.
27
 Therefore, he says, 'constant 
vigilance is required to ensure that new advances in medical technology are kept within 
ethical guidelines'. The learned author lists a host of possible sources of the denigration 
of human dignity by scientific power.  His comprehensive list of sources includes, inter 
alia, foetal experimentation, human experimentation, embryo transplantation, in vitro 
fertilization, foetus farms, sperm and ova banks, selective breeding, genetic structuring of 
humans, sex preselection, organ transplants, enzyme engineering, sale of human tissue, 
euthanasia techniques, computerized regimentation of society and data bank 
infringements of privacy.  
6  Exploring a philosophy of human dignity  
Finally, a word on the origin of the idea/concept/value of human dignity. The first draft of 
article 1 of the German Grundgesetz produced by the Herrenchiemsee Conference  
26 Weeramantry Justice without Frontiers 89.  
27 Supra at 89-99.  
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stated that "the dignity of man is founded upon eternal rights with which every person is 
endowed by nature." The main parties to the conference agreed that human dignity is 
anterior to the state and thus transcendental. However, the Western individual-centred 
human rights paradigm views the individual as the ultimate measure of all things. There is 
thus no notion of the human being subordinating him/herself to a Transcendental Reality 
which, in fact, establishes the parameters for the exercise of one's rights. Seen in this 
light, is there not a need to explore a philosophy of human dignity having its roots in the 
moral, theological and spiritual traditions of the world?  In the words of a leading scholar, 
Chandra Muzaffar:
 28 
 
[W]hether one articulates rights or upholds responsibilities, shouldn't they 
be guided by universal moral and spiritual values which would determine 
the sort of rights we pursue and the type of responsibilities we fulfil. 
Without a larger spiritual and moral framework, which endows human 
endeavour with meaning and purpose, with coherence and unity, wouldn't 
the emphasis on rights per se lead to moral chaos... What are human 
rights if they are not related to more fundamental questions about the 
human being?  Who is the human being? Why is the human being here? 
Where does the human being go from here? How can one talk of the rights 
of the human being without a more profound understanding of the human 
being him[her]self?
 29 
 
Muzaffar declares:  
The great challenge before us is to develop this vision of human dignity 
culled from our religious and spiritual philosophies into a comprehensive 
charter of values and principles, responsibilities and rights, roles and  
28  Recently elected the Wiegand Foundation Distinguished Visitor by Duke University, USA.  
29  Muzaffar "From Human Rights to Human Dignity".  
30  Ibid.  
 
NMI Goolam  PER/PELJ 2001(4)1 
52/74 
 
relationships acceptable to human beings everywhere. To do this we 
should first distinguish what is universal and eternal within our respective 
traditions from what is particularistic and contextual.
30  
7 The essence of human dignity in South Africa today  
I believe that the essence of human dignity in our country today was succinctly summed 
up by Judge Arthur Chaskalson in the Third Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture, when he 
said:  
As an abstract value, common to the core values of our Constitution, 
dignity informs the content of all the concrete rights and plays a role in the 
balancing process necessary to bring different rights and values into 
harmony. It too, however, must find its place in the constitutional order. 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the application of the social and 
economic rights entrenched in the Constitution. These rights are rooted in 
respect for human dignity, for how can there be dignity in a life lived 
without access to housing, health care, food, water or in the case of 
persons unable to support themselves, without appropriate assistance. In 
the light of our history the recognition and realisation of the evolving 
demands of human dignity in our society - a society under transformation -
is of particular importance for the type of society we have in the future.
31  
 
31  See n 16 supra at 204-205.  
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